Are election polling misses becoming more prevalent? Are they more likely in some contexts than others? Here we undertake an over-time and cross-national assessment of prediction errors in pre-election polls. Our analysis draws on more than 30,000 national polls from 351 general elections in 45 countries between 1942 and 2017. We proceed in the following way. First, building on previous studies, we show how errors in national polls evolve in a structured way over the election timeline. Second, we examine errors in polls in the final week of the election campaign to assess performance across election years. Third, we undertake a pooled analysis of polling errors-controlling for a number of institutional and party features-that enables us to test whether poll errors have increased or decreased over time. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the recent performance of polls has not been outside the ordinary. However, the performance of polls does vary across political contexts and in understandable ways.
Are election polling misses becoming more prevalent? Are they more likely in some contexts than others? Here we undertake an over-time and cross-national assessment of prediction errors in pre-election polls. Our analysis draws on more than 30,000 national polls from 351 general elections in 45 countries between 1942 and 2017. We proceed in the following way. First, building on previous studies, we show how errors in national polls evolve in a structured way over the election timeline. Second, we examine errors in polls in the final week of the election campaign to assess performance across election years. Third, we undertake a pooled analysis of polling errors-controlling for a number of institutional and party features-that enables us to test whether poll errors have increased or decreased over time. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the recent performance of polls has not been outside the ordinary. However, the performance of polls does vary across political contexts and in understandable ways.
In the wake of the 2015 UK general election and the 2016 US presidential election, the performance of the polling industry has been under much scrutiny. Indeed, the performance of polls in the UK and the US general elections prompted unusually comprehensive-and lengthy-reports into what went wrong 1, 2 . Those reports suggest that the performance of pre-election polls-at least the national surveys in the US and the UK-was largely consistent with the historical norm in terms of the magnitude of polling error. This is not to say that the pre-election polls were without problems, particularly at the state level in the United States, where errors reached historical highs 2 . Furthermore, the claim that polling is in crisis and that poll errors are increasing remains popular, especially with commentators 3, 4 and even some scholars [5] [6] [7] [8] . But, are these claims true? Are polling misses becoming more common?
In this article, we undertake an over-time and cross-national comparison of pre-election poll estimates and election outcomes. Our analysis draws on more than 30,000 national polls from 351 elections in 45 countries between 1942 and 2017. To be clear, we focus only on national polls and do not examine subnational polls, which fared poorly in the 2016 US presidential election 2 , or referendum polls, the object of scrutiny after the Brexit vote 9 . We also focus on poll aggregations, not particular polls or survey organizations, that is, we examine the daily average from all available polls-the 'poll-of-polls'-in which each poll is dated by the mid-point of the fieldwork period.
We undertake several analyses. First, building on previous studies, we show how poll errors evolve in a structured way over the election cycle and illustrate how this varies across election types. Second, we examine errors in polls in the final week of the campaign, to assess poll performance across election years, benchmarking recent polling 'misses' . Third, we undertake pooled analysis of polling errors-controlling for numerous institutional and party features-to explicitly test whether poll errors have increased or decreased over time. We find that, contrary to much conventional wisdom, the recent performance of polls has not been outside the ordinary; if anything, polling errors are getting smaller on average, not bigger.
Pollsters have sought to measure citizens' preferences for candidates or parties for almost three-quarters of a century. Although the wording of survey questions differs often owing to differences in context, most pre-election polls ask how citizens would vote "if the election were held today. " We draw on what we believe is the most extensive cross-national dataset of polls of vote intentions for presidential and legislative elections 10 , extended for this analysis to include elections up to 2017. This data-set consists of 30,916 polls spanning the period from 1942 to 2017. It covers a total of 351 elections in 45 countries-presidential elections in 23 countries and legislative elections in 31 countries, summarized in Table 1 . In most countries, the common practice is to report 'headline' vote intention figures excluding don't knows and refusals, which is what we use here. Thus, for our analysis, we drop polls for legislative elections in Japan because it is the only case in which these are included in the headline figures. Doing this reduces the number of polls by 199 across five elections. Not surprisingly, given the large number of polls in the dataset, it has marginal consequences for the results.
On average, we have 687 separate polls for approximately eight elections per country, or about 88 polls per election cycle. As most polls are conducted over multiple days, we 'date' each poll by the middle day of the period that the survey is in the field. For days when more than one poll result is recorded, we pool the results together into a single poll-of-polls, taking the average poll estimate for each party or candidate. In the final week before the election, we have 1,339 polls over 220 elections in 32 countries. The data used in our analysis are available at the Harvard Dataverse (https://doi. org/10.7910/DVN/8421DX).
Recall that we are interested in the amount of prediction error in these pre-election polls and how it varies across time and space. Thus, we need data on the vote shares that parties and candidates received on Election Day to compare with poll results. For this, we rely on a wide range of official sources and election data resources (for details, see ref. 10 ). For our main analysis, the dependent variable is the simple absolute vote-poll error: the absolute value of the difference between party or candidate share of the polls and the Election Day vote share. For instance, polls in the final week of the 2015 British general election campaign showed the Conservative Party receiving 33.2% in the polls, which is substantially below their vote share of 37.8%, producing an absolute error of 4.6 percentage points. In addition to the absolute vote-poll error for each party or candidates, we also consider the log of the odds ratio of the poll to vote share and the absolute error on the margin between the leading two parties or candidates.
Our analysis considers three patterns. First, building on previous research, we examine how poll errors vary over the course of Although our primary interest is in the performance of vote intention polls just before Election Day, it is useful to consider how they line up with the election result over the course of the election cycle 11 . This is important because it reveals how aggregate electoral preferences evolve over the election 'timeline'-whether the socalled fundamentals are in place early or come into focus late in the campaign. Fundamentals are those factors that matter on Election Day, and include variables that are 'internal' to voters, such as party identification, and those that are 'external' and influence all voters, such as the performance of the sitting government or the state of the economy 11 . For this analysis, we focus on elections for which we have poll readings beginning 200 days before Election Day, that is, to avoid change in estimates due to the addition of cases over the timeline. This leaves us with 286 discrete election cycles and 216 parties, where independent candidates in presidential elections are treated as unique parties and where we exclude those parties whose vote share is less than 5%. In the dataset, polls are missing on 86% of days on average, which implies that we typically have readings for around 131 parties on each day (with polls dated according to the mid-point of the fieldwork period). Using these data, we can assess the degree to which the election results match poll estimates on different days over the timeline. Figure 1a provides a very general take. It plots the mean abso-
for all parties i using polls from each of the last 200 days of the cycle, pooling all 286 elections for which we have poll data. In the figure, we can see that poll errors decline over the election timeline. Using polls from 150 to 200 days before Election Day, the mean absolute error is close to four percentage points; 50 days in advance, it is approximately three points; on the eve of elections, it is under two points. This is not surprising but is satisfying, as it shows that polls become more reflective of the actual result, although they remain imperfect even at the very end of the campaign. The declining error owes partly to the increasing number of polls (and respondents) as the campaign unfolds 12 , which helps to explain the dampening oscillations we observe in the figure. Much of the early jaggedness is owing to the relatively sparse N of polls and the changing mix of elections (and parties) from day to day, which stabilizes as the timeline unfolds and polling increases, thus reducing variation.
Although the results in Fig. 1a are informative about the global pattern in the poll-vote match over time, there is reason to think that they conceal differences across political institutions. Scholars have found that preferences evolve differently in different institutional contexts, after all, which implies that the convergence of the polls on the vote also differs. Of special importance is the difference between legislative and presidential elections 10 . (There is no real difference between legislative elections in presidential and parliamentary systems.) Voters' preferences crystallize earlier in the electoral cycle in legislative elections than in presidential elections. The patterns in Fig. 1b are consistent with these expectations. At the beginning of the timeline, 200 days out, polls are more informative about the vote in legislative elections, with a mean absolute error of approximately 3.3 percentage points compared with 5.9 points for presidential elections. The gap narrows over time, especially during the last 50 days, but a slight difference remains the day before Election Day, as errors are still somewhat larger in presidential elections. By that point, preferences in both types of elections are nearly fully formed.
We have seen that poll errors tend to decline over time within particular election cycles, and particularly in presidential elections. Thus, the timing of polls is an important factor in their predictive power and that context also matters. This comes as little surprise but is reassuring. What we want to know now is whether and to what extent the predictive power of the polls has changed over time, across elections. Are polling errors more common today than in the past?
There are reasons to believe polling errors might have increased over time.
First, new, less expensive and easier polling methods-most notably online polling and interactive voice response (IVR) pollshave emerged. As such, pollsters are now using many different methods, the consequences of which are not fully understood. This can introduce error for each of the organizations that are using such methods but also for the industry collectively, insofar as the errors of particular methods (including adjustment procedures) do not cancel out. Even to the extent that the average performance remains the same, the variation in poll accuracy may have changed.
Second, for more established methods such as face-to-face and telephone polling, response rates have declined. Twenty years ago, more than one-third of respondents contacted would take surveys; today, the number is less than 10% 13 . To be clear, their rate of contact is approximately 60% and the cooperation rate is 15%, yielding a response rate of 9%. This potentially jeopardizes the representativeness of surveys, which has fairly obvious consequences for polling error, and has been implicated in recent polling misses 1,2 . Non-response bias can be a particular problem when response rates are low, as was highlighted in the analysis of the 2015 British general election polls 14 . Thus, the trend in response rates could pose an increasing problem for pollsters in accurately representing the voting electorate.
Although the proliferation of approaches and declining response rates pose real challenges, we nevertheless have a lot more survey respondents, that is, there are more polls often with larger sample sizes, and most survey organizations have incorporated weighting and other techniques that are designed to increase representativeness. Thus, it may be that we actually have a fairly reasonable portrait of electoral preferences, particularly when we combine polls from different survey organizations, where errors may to a large . Unfortunately, we do not have much information about the practices of different survey organizations, particularly going back in time, which precludes an analysis of the effects of many poll-level factors. Some recent studies of poll performance have examined survey mode, finding minimal effects 2, 16 , whereas others have found significant 'house effects' , which lead some pollsters to systematically underestimate or overestimate support for particular parties or candidates 15, 17, 18 . We can still examine the performance of poll aggregations.
Polling accuracy is not just about pollsters, of course, as the behaviour of voters matters as well. Of special importance for poll errors is the structure of the vote. We know that traditional cleavages have weakened over time in most countries 19, 20 , with the decline of class voting observed across many countries for several decades [21] [22] [23] . As cleavages weaken, voter behaviour becomes less predictable and more susceptible to the influence of short-term factors 24 . This may make polls-even close to Election Day-less predictive of the vote, at least where partisan and other cleavages have declined.
For our analysis of polling accuracy across election years, we focus on polls conducted during the last week of election campaigns in the 220 national elections in 32 countries between 1942 and 2017. (In the 12 other countries, we do not have polls in the final week of election campaigns.) For each party or candidate, we calculate the absolute error of the average vote estimate of all polls conducted during the final week of the election campaign. Figure 2a plots these errors by year.
From the figure, it is immediately evident that the number of elections for which we have poll data has increased over time. This partly reflects the growth in the number of democracies over the period, but it also reflects the growth in pre-election polling. Although polling has increased over time, polling errors have not. Consider the annual averages of poll errors indicated by the black circles in Fig.  2a . For the entire period, the mean absolute error was 2.1%. This seemingly is considerably greater than we would expect based on sampling error variance alone. Sampling theory indicates that the poll 'margin of error' reflects the size of the sample and the distribution of responses, specifically, the proportion giving a particular survey response. The standard error of a proportion, p, can be calculated using the equation
, where n is the size of the sample. This means that the observed error variance increases as ~. p 0 5 . Thus, the margin of error of a poll is equal to ± . × − 1 96
We have data on the sample size of polls for a subset of 16 countries, which enables us to determine that the absolute error expected based on sampling theory, assuming random sampling, is 0.7 percentage points, by comparison with the observed absolute error of 1.8 points for those cases. Given common survey practices, our estimate almost certainly understates the true amount of error owing to sampling, though there are other sources of survey error 25 . As can be seen in Fig. 2a , the average absolute error has bounced around somewhat over the years but has not increased. The mean error was 2.1% during the 1940s and 1950s (in the early days of polling), 2.1% during the 1960s and 1970s, and has been 2.0% since 2000. The bivariate correlation between the polling year and the absolute error is − 0.11 (P = 0.40, N = 61). Note that if the correlation is estimated for all polls (N = 763), not the annual averages, the correlation is − 0.06 (P = 0.08). Poll performance just has not changed in a secular way over the past 60 years, certainly not for the worse.
If we restrict our analysis to those countries where we have regular polling over the same extended time period (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Great Britain and the United States), we observe that poll errors actually have declined over time. This ensures that the result is not due to the changing mix of countries covered by the data. Taking poll readings for these 11 countries from 1977 onwards, the negative correlation between polling year and error is even stronger, − 0.15 (P < 0.01, N = 398); using annual averages, the correlation is a slightly larger in absolute terms, − 0.28 (P = 0.09, N = 37).
So far, we have considered the trend in the absolute error between poll estimates and the vote share, but there are other measures of polling accuracy. One possibility is the absolute error on 'the margin', that is, the lead of the party receiving the highest vote share over the party receiving the next highest vote share. For two parties, i and j, the absolute error on the margin can be expressed in the form: 
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This often can be more consequential in terms of predicting the election 'winner' , either in terms of government formation or in the translation of votes into seats in single-member district systems. Another possibility is the odds ratio of a poll compared to the actual outcome 26, 27 . For party i, receiving p as a proportion of the poll share and v as a proportion of the vote share, this measure takes the form:
When pooling across parties and across elections, measures of the direction of errors are less informative-as these tend to cancel out in the aggregate-so we calculate the absolute value of the log of the odds ratio. Figure 2b -d plot the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) curves with a bandwidth of 0.3 for the absolute error, the absolute error on the margin and the absolute value of the log odds ratio of the poll and vote shares, using the annual average of these measures. These reveal that, although polling seems to have become more inaccurate during the 1960s, performance levelled off thereafter, but with some ebb and flow. In the case of the absolute error and the absolute error on the margin, accuracy actually seems to have increased in recent decades.
Although the average errors may have levelled off and possibly declined over time, it could be the case that the spread has increased. To assess this possibility, we plot the LOWESS curve of the yearly variance of the absolute errors across elections in Fig. 2e. (Note that the calculation excludes outliers from 1985 and 2004, detected with the Grubbs-Stefansky test, that otherwise obscure the longterm trend in the variance of the absolute error.) The figure reveals a drop in the variance of absolute poll errors during the 1950s, when polls were relatively sparse, followed by a steady rise thereafter. This implies that the spread of poll errors has increased, approximately 0.02 of a point per year since 1965. Now, the trend could be due to the increasing diversity of polling methodologies, the greater difficulty of obtaining representative samples or the nature of the electorates in countries that entered the poll dataset in later periods, among other possible explanations. If we limit the analysis to the 11 countries where we have regular polling data from 1977 onwards, the trend in the variance of the absolute error is downwards rather than upwards (b = − 0.02). This can be seen in Fig. 2f . The trend is flatter but still negative if we consider the annual average variance of absolute errors of the final polls within each election (b = − 0.01). These results imply that the increase in the growing spread of poll errors is in large part driven by the growing mix of countries where pre-election polls have been conducted over time.
This historical record provides us with a benchmark to consider the performance of polls in recent prominent elections, many of which have been the subject of scrutiny noted above. Figure 3 This analysis focuses on the absolute error of the polls for the two main parties or candidates, for example, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in Great Britain, Le Pen and Macron in the 2017 French presidential election, as the error tends to be lower for smaller parties owing to sampling theory. In some multi-party systems, the pair of parties receiving the highest vote share differs from the pair receiving the highest poll share (typically due to the closeness of the election). In those cases (Denmark, Spain and Iceland), we consider the absolute error for the three largest parties-as our analysis might otherwise ignore an important part of polling misses. Now, it is possible that the patterns we observe in polls over the post-war period reflect the kinds of political and electoral systems that have most frequently held elections. It may be, for instance, that the increasing number of countries using proportional representation (PR) has reduced one source of poll error-as party attachments matter more in those systems than in non-PR settings 10 . Table 2 summarizes the absolute vote-poll error (using the average poll estimate during the last week before the election) by election and party type. As the numbers are weekly averages, they differ slightly from the daily eve-of-election polls depicted in Fig. 1 . The results in the table indicate that poll errors are higher in presidential elections (an average of 2.7 percentage points) than in legislative elections (1.8 percentage points), higher in single-member district (SMD) systems (2.3 percentage points) than in PR systems (1.6 percentage points)-with a similar difference between candidate-centric and party-centric systems, respectively. Errors are moderately related to the effective number of parties (ENP), with an average error of 2.2 when there are fewer than 3.0 ENP, compared to an error of 1.7 percentage points for equal or more than 3.0 ENP. (Following a previous study 28 , the ENP is calculated as the sum of the squared fraction of votes (V) for each party i, divided into one; that is, =
). Much the same is true for participation in government, as the error of poll estimates for parties in government (2.0 percentage points) is only slightly higher than for parties in opposition (1.7 points). Although informative, basic descriptive analyses of poll errors may be misleading; that is, some of the differences we observe for one factor may be due to the other factors. For example, opposition parties are more likely to be small parties, so their errors may have less to do with their opposition status and more to do with the size of their vote share.
A more general modelling strategy would treat the absolute error as a dependent variable, enabling us to conduct simultaneous tests of party and system characteristics and over-time trend. We could model the error as a function of various features of electoral systems and parties, along with the election year. The equation might take the form: where the absolute error for each party or candidate in each election is a function of some intercept (a) plus whether the election is a presidential race (Presidential), whether it takes place in a PR system (PR), whether the system is candidate-centric (Candidate), whether the ENP is greater than 3.0 (ENP), whether the party or candidate is in government (Government), whether they received more than 20% in the relevant election (Size), and the election year (Year). The latter enables us to determine whether polling errors have increased or decreased in magnitude, after accounting for the underlying features of elections. Results of estimating this equation are reported in Table 3 . To begin with, we estimate a bivariate regression relating the absolute error to year, that is, to document the trend in the absence of controls. The results shown in the first column of the table reveal that poll errors have not changed much over time, and that, if anything, given the coefficient is less than 0, they may have declined slightly. As can be seen in the second column of Table 3 , adding the various contextual covariates makes little difference to the over-time pattern. There is evidence from these results that poll errors are around 0.5 percentage points higher in presidential systems (P < 0.01), 0.8 points lower in PR systems (P < 0.05) and 0.9 points higher (P < 0.001) for large parties. (As noted earlier, the latter is exactly what we expect based on sampling theory.) There are not any significant differences in polling accuracy between party-centric and Letters NATure HumAN BeHAviOur candidate-centric systems, systems with more or less ENP, or government and opposition parties. Most notably for our analysis, the effect of the election year is a trivial − 0.001 and does not even approach significance (P = 0.85). There simply has been no discernible decline in the accuracy of polls over time.
We observe a clearer pattern if we limit the analysis to elections in the 11 countries where we have regular poll data over a concurrent period, that is, since 1977. This enables us to be sure that over-time trends in poll accuracy are not due to the changing mix of elections and democracies where polls were conducted (or where we have data). The results of estimating the same equations as above for the restricted set of cases are reported in Table 4 . In some contrast with Table 3 , the bivariate regression in the first column of Table 4 indicates that poll errors in this particular set of countries have not only not increased over time but have actually decreased. The coefficient (− 0.02) implies a fairly substantial decline of about 0.8 percentage points over the past 40 years, 40% of the mean absolute error (2.0 points) in our sample.
The pattern holds when the various covariates are included. As can be seen in the second column of Table 4 , errors tend to be around 0.9 points higher for large parties (P < 0.001), exactly as we saw in Table 3 . The results in Table 4 also reveal that poll accuracy in the set of 11 countries is still significantly (P < 0.01) greater in PR systems, with errors approximately 0.8 percentage points lower. Most importantly, with the controls added, the effect (− 0.01) of the election year is still negative and significant (P = 0.04). In cases where there is regular polling for elections over a period of almost 40 years, the evidence is that polls have become more accurate, not less.
If we instead use the absolute value of the log odds ratio of the poll and vote shares as the dependent variable, we find similar results-no evidence of an over-time trend in errors for all elections, and a negative and significant trend for countries with regular polling since 1977, again indicating a decline in polling errors. There also is no significant time trend when the absolute error on the margin or the absolute value of the log odds ratio of the poll over vote margin are taken as the dependent variable, either for all elections or those where we have regular polling since 1977. In combination, these results highlight that features of electoral systems and political parties are important factors in assessing polling accuracy, and that claims that polls have become increasingly unreliable are not supported by the evidence.
Although claims about the demise of pre-election polling have become common in recent times, we find little basis to support them. In fact, some of our findings point to just the reverse. Relying on vote intention polls from more than 200 elections in 32 countries over a period of more than 70 years, there is no evidence that poll errors have increased over time, and the performance of polls in very recent elections is no exception. This implies that declining response rates and the growing variation in survey mode, sampling and weighting protocols have had little effect on the performance of preelection polls, at least when taken together. Of course, those trends still may affect the performance of particular polls, which cancel out when different polls are combined. That may help to explain why the variance in poll errors across elections has increased over time, although it is important to note that much of the apparent increase reflects the growing mix of countries where pre-elections polls were conducted. This remains an important subject of future research.
What we do find is that a basic feature of political parties influences the accuracy of polls, namely, their size. This is exactly what we would expect based on sampling theory, and also makes more understandable the seeming surprises in recent elections. That is, although all polls contain error, it tends to be greatest for the largest parties (or candidates), which are the ones competing for power. Moreover, these errors are most consequential when elections are close, as they can be decisive for government control, as was the case in the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections and the 2016 US presidential election. The magnitude of the poll error in each of these elections was not especially unusual given the electoral history. However, it did matter greatly for binary predictions of election winners and losers.
Characteristics of political systems also seem to influence the accuracy of polling. There is evidence that errors tend to be lower in PR systems, consistent with vote choices being based on partisan loyalties, which tend to be more structured. Errors are also lower for presidential elections, at least in the United States and France, the only presidential systems for which we have data over long periods of time.
We have not considered all possible explanations of polling error here. Some countries ban the publication of polling results for periods in the run-up to elections, which may condition our results. It is also possible that factors such as changes in electoral rules or 
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NATure HumAN BeHAviOur registration, or volatility within the electorate itself (from one election to the next), might influence polling accuracy-either due to switching between parties or patterns of turnout that lead pollsters' likely voter models to become ineffective. Similarly, survey mode could give rise to systematic variations in poll accuracy that we were unable to test here. These are also important subjects for future research. In addition, to be clear, we are not claiming that traditional polling methods are working just as well (or better) now than in the past-or that polling has not changed over time. Rather, we infer, based on our evidence, that survey organizations have adapted to the well-known challenges they face, at least when taken together. Most notable here may be the almost pervasive use of weighting protocols based on relevant population parameters 29, 30 . Ultimately, although the polling industry faces a range of substantial challenges, we find no evidence to support the claims of a crisis in the accuracy of polling. Taking into account both space, that is, countries, and time provides an important perspective on polling accuracy. Periodically, pollsters get it wrong and are subject to a great deal of attention, particularly when this influences expectations of who will form the government. Indeed, this can lead to methodological reflection and innovation, and in turn improvements in polling.
Code availability. Stata do-files to reproduce these analyses are available at the Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/ DVN/8421DX).
Data availability.
The data used to produce these analyses are available at the Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/ DVN/8421DX).
